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prior to his h. ving atTived t>n the scene.
it might have th: •n " lit~~ tlme to dig
in and get the facts, because he was not
present when these events occurred.
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. But he was
on the scene when Mr. Hollyday was
fired.
Mr. CAPEHART. Yes. he was; and I
think that before our investigation Is
concluded. the Senator from Texas will
l;e well sati~fled with it.
1\!r. JOHNSON of Texas. But Mr.
Hollyday was an appointee of this administration.
Mr. CAPEHART. He was an appointee of this administration; there is
no question about that.
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mt'. President, will
the senator from Montana yield to me
for 2 minutes?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield, provided
I do not lose my ri~ht to the floor.
1\Ir. WILLIAMS. I am not interested
In getting into the controversy as to
which administration or which public
official might be responsible. I wish to
commend the Senator from Virginia !Mr.
BYRDI upon the report which he has
made. I think the one thing we should
keep before us is not the question as to
who might have been responsible. but
rather the fact that thousands of homeowners throuchout the country have lost
millions of dollars. I am confident that
the Senator from Virginia will pursue the
investigation which he has startedand render his report to the Congress. I
hope that those who are responsible in
either administration \,_.ill be brought to
justice. letting the chips fall where they
may.
Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from New York for not to exceed
2 minutes. provided I do not lose my
right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection. it Is so ordered.
Mr. LEHMAN. I was present at the
meeting of the Committee on Banking
and Currency this morning, and voted
to carry on an ilwestigation, because I
think the alleged facts concerning Federal Housing certainly merit and require
such an investigation.
But as to the hearing this morning
at which Mr. Cole testified. I was not
at all impressed with the contention that
the blame. or even a great part of the
blame. rested with previous Democratic
administrations.
After all. the Republicans have been
in office for 15 months, and from the
testimony which was given there was no
Indication that any effective steps had
been taken to correct the situation which
it is alleged has existed and which probably shall exist. Certainly, there was
nothing whatsoe,·er in the statement of
Mr. Cole to Indicate that, so far as Title
I Is concerned. there were any steps at
nil taken until very recently to stop
the inequitous alleged practice of encout·aging costly and unnecessary repairs to houses. the loans on which have
been guaranteed by the Government.
Certainly nothing has been developed
thus far which would Indicate that the

blame is wholly or even in greater part
ascribable to Democratic administra- ·
Uons. I shall listen to the investigation
with great attention. I felt It my duty
to vote for the investigation, and I shall
watch its course with full care. I would,
however. urge upon the distinguished
chairman of the committee, on which I
have the honor to serve, to withhold his
judgment and his comments until the
investigation has proceeded further to
its conclusion.
Mr. CAPEHART. I assure the Senator from New York that I share his
hope. I trust that poll~ics can be complete!y left out of the PICture.
Mr. LEHMAN. I 11ope so.
Mr. CAPEHART. I think they can
be. and that we should try to see to it
that that is done. I simply '~!shed to
keep the RECORD straight rn these
respects.
.
Mr. LEHMAN.. I. too, have spoken m
the hope of keepmg the REcORD straight.
LAST CHANCE IN INDOCHINA
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pr~sident, on
March 22, I addressed the Senate on Indochina. My 1·easons for doing so were
twofold. I wanted. first of all, to call
attention to this obscure area of crisis
in Asia. It was my hope that In alerting
the Senate, I would also alert the American people. As a Nation we have an
enormous stake In the outcome of this
crisis.
Beyond the desire to bring the Indochinese situation to the attention of the
Senate. I had a second reason in discussing the matter several weeks ago.
At the end of this month, the four major
powers, Great Britain, France, the
United States. and the Soviet Union,
will convene at Geneva-v:lth Communist China as an interested state-to
consider the situation in the Far East.
This confet·ence may well represent the
climax of the bitter. ruthless. war in Indochina. It may decide whether the
future of the 27 million Inhabitants of
the area shall veer toward freedom or
totalitarianism. It may determine
whether this country and other free nations shall again be subjected to a direct
aggression launched from east Asia.
It may cast the die for or against
western European unity. In this
shrunken world of ours all events are inten·elated. The decisions on Indochina
taken at Geneva will echo not only
throughout Asia but in Europe and our
own country as well.
The Chinese Communists and the
Russians will enter the Geneva Conference in a united front. There is not
likely to be any pushing and pulling between them. There Is little doubt as to
what they want and what they will try
to obtain at Geneva so far as Indochina
is concerned. They will seek what they
have always sought. They will seek international Communist domination of
this region. or, at the very least, the
conditions for Communist domination
in the future.
But what of the non-Communist
powers at Geneva? Will they know just
as clearly what they want? Will they

go to Geneva with a clarity and a unity
of purpose which will stand up against
that of the Communists? Or will they
stumble into the conference. each in his
own peculiar way and for his own lmmediatc ends? Will the non-Communist
powers know beforehand and establish
beforehand the minimum conditions
that are essential to prevent Communist control of Indochina and beyond,
all of southeast Asia?
These were the quettions which led me
to raise the issue of Indochina on the
floor of the Senate several weeks ago ;
these questions. and, as I mentioned before, a desire to lift the obscurity which
has surrounded this subject and kept
knowledge of it from the American
people.
Since that time we have had more
light on the Indochinese situation. The
vicious battle at Dicn Bien Phu has
helped to focus the attention of the press
on the situation. The Secretary of State
is now In Europe confen·ing with the
Western European Powers. The administration last week finally took several
Members of Congress into its confidence.
I regret to say. however, that, to the best
of my knowledge, the administration has
not yet seen fit to include the chairman
and the ranking minority members of
the House Foreign Atrail'S committee or
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
In its trust. I hope that this was not an
intentional ovet'S!ght, and that it will be
rectified before the opening of the conference in Geneva..
Light has also been shed on the Indochinese crisis by the illuminating remarks which have been made on the
floor of the Senate in recent days. I refer to the admirable addresses of the
Senator from Iowa lMr. GILLEm:] on
April 5 and that of the Senator from
Massachusetts lMr. KENNEDY! on April
6. I commend these addresses and the
remarks of the distinguished majority
leader !Mr. KHowLANDJ, the able Senator
from Washington lMr. JACKSON). the
able Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Sr&N·
NrsJ. and others to those Members of
the Senate who were unable to be present
when they were delivered. I commend
them for their penetrating analysis of
the problem. their sincerity, and their
forthright facing of the facts.
While the Senate may discuss this
problem. and the press may w1·ite about
it, the President and the Secretary of
State must bear the responsibility for
dealing with the situation. They, and
they alone, must lay down our official
policy, with respect to Indoehina,ln clear
and unmistakable language.
On March 30, Secretary Dulles addressed himself to this policy In a speech
before the Overseas Press Club. He has
since elaborated on that statement on
several occasions. His current conversations In France and Britain lend additional emphasis to the policy.
It Is clear now that the administration believes our strategic stake In Indochina. Is very great. It is also clear that
we have been committed very deeply in
Indochina, probably even to the extent
of military action by American forces.
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It Is not clear, however, that the POlicies of the administration have yet established the minimum conditions to
prncnt Communist seizure of Indochina
without full-scale war. It is not clear
that these cond1Uons are even understood by the administration.
It is for this reason that I have sought
the floor today to ~peak again on Indochma. In a few days the Secretary of
State will be In Geneva. When that
tJmc comt's, it v.ill be too late to improvise solutions. It will be too late to
prevent a settlement negotiated from
weakne<s rather than strength. It will
be too late, in short, to keep Indochina
from fallmg or slipping Into the net of
Communist totahtarianism. or, perhaps,
this country from an equally disastrous
full-scale military Involvement In the
conflict.
The Secretary will co to Geneva with
the best wishes of all of us for success.
His burden will be great, and he will need
the support of a united Nation. Although there has not been the kind of
bipartisan consultation that there should
have been from the very beginning on
this and other Issues, he shall not lack
bipartisan SUPPOrt In his mission. The
Secretary will cary to Geneva our hopes
for a solution that will end the bloodshed
in Indochina, if he can accomplish this
without the loss of Indochina to the
Communists.
But are hopes enoul!"h? Are hopes a
substitute for the actions which are
necessary, which must be taken to prevent either a St'ttlement of appeasement
or our full military commitment In Indochina?
When r SPOke on March 22, I said:
There Is still time, even before the
(len••• conference open!!, to rally the forces
or freedom to meet the 61tuatlon In Indochin~>. There I~ atlll Ume to asoert a pooltl,·e
purpo<cful lcnd<TOhlp. There Is still ume,
but It lA running short. Will we make use
or It before It tatoo~~~?

Mr. President. I ask that question
again, today: Will we make use of the
time that is left us before it is too late?
In these remaining days the free nations
have, I belleve, wl1at may be a last
chance in Indochina.
I am not an alarmist. I do not wish
to sucgest that the world will be turned
upside down overnight by what Is or is
not done at Geneva. I do believe, however. that patterns may be set at Geneva
which will determine the futu1·c not only
of Indochina but of all southC'ast Asia.
Patterns may be set which might well
influence the entire POlitical fabric of
the French Republic and touch on every
aspect of Western European unity. Patterns may be set which wlll determine
whether aggression shall again gathe1·
force on the shores of the South China
sen.s to be hw-led at this Nation !rom
acroos the Pacific. This was the pattern
o! the Japanese aggression in the last
decade. Will it be the pattern o! another
totalitarian a~;sresslon out of the East
in the next?
This need not be the case If the free
nations sec clearly their objectives in
Indochina, and act boldly and firmly to
achieve them.

What are the objectives we seek?
What are these objectives for which the
French have fought so long?
What are the obJect.ives for which we
have already provided probably $2!2
billion of aid to SUPPOrt the war In
Indochina?
What are the obJectives for which
thousands of Indochinese natlonaltsts in
the three Associat~ States of Vietnam,
Laoo, and Cambodia have risked their
lives, for w•hich brother has fought
brother in this ugly, shadowy war of the
jungles and the deltas?
These objectives have often been described in unflattering terms by those
who oppese our pat·ticipation in the conflict. They will a.sl'ert that the French
are in Indochina to cling to an outmoded empire for profit or for reasons
of false pride. They will declare that
the Indochinese nationaltsts who OPPO~C
the Communists are corrupt, and servants of the French. They will say that
the United States POUrs out its wealth
for imperialistic ends, or if not because
of imperialism. out of stupidity.
Let me say that elements that arc baso
and unworthy manage to Infiltrate Into
all worthwhile undertakings. I have no
doubt that this is no less true In the
Indochinese situation than It is In any
other human situation. But I find It
hard to believe that unworthy clements
or motivations are prePOnderant In Indochina. I find it hard to believe that
year aft~r year the French people would
countenance the spilling of the blood of
their sons for a base purpe.se. I find
it hard to believe that the President of
the United States and the administration would associate this country with
a base purPOOe and would underwrite Its
cost at a current rate of more than a
billion dollars a year. I t\nd lt hard
to believe that the Indochinese natlonaltsts would continue In this strug~:le,
would risk their lives and fortunes, for
a base PurPOse.
If there were a significant degree ot
truth in these cynical charges, it would
have been the duty of the President and
the Secretary of State to have rePOrted
it to the American people long ago. It
would have been their duty to adjust
American foreign policies accordingly.
They have not so rePOrted. They have
intensified, rather than changed, their
policy of commitment In that area.
There must be, then, only one reason
for pursuing the struggle in Indochina.
It is the only reason which makes sense.
In this reason, the Interests of the
French, the Indochinese. and ourselves
converge. It ls that the people of the
Indochinese states shall have a right to
work out their destiny in freedom. secure from the threat of alien domination
which presently emanates from Communist China. This is the sole practical
aim. and the only morally justified aim
for the sacrfices that are being made.
If we can realize this aim, each nation
who participates In the struggle will
serve its own best interests.
The French will be able to withdraw
In time from Indochina, !rom this struggle which has cost them so dearly. They
will be able to withdraw, not. in disgrace,
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not In humiJilltion, but lro «:ecping with
the finest tr; ,'ition of /.:.eir civilization.
They will withdraw with a sense of mission fulfilled. They will have made one
more contribution to the growth of world
freedom and culture. Mr. President, the
French will find that the bonds they have
forged over the last century with the
Indochinese will be stronger in the
equality of Uberty than they were when
Indochina was admintstered In inequalIty as a colony. The French then will
be able to turn their great diplomatic
and military capacities to Europe and
the solution of Its many pressing problems.
For ourselves, the freedom of the people of Indochina and their security from
a~:grcssive totalitarianism are all we seek.
Thcy will be ample recompense for the
contributions we have made to the struggle. If Indochina emerges free, it will
mean that our country will be safe from
a rcpeti tlon of the kind of aggression
that In the last decade plunged us into
World Wa1· II. International communism will be denied strategic military
bases from which to launch such an
aggression. It wlll be denied the strate~lc raw materials of Indochina and
the rest of southeast Asia. It will be
denied the surplus rice of the area-the
tice on which the armies of Asia march.
If Indochina emerges free, moreover,
It will mean an extension of fundamental
principles in which we believe. These
arc the principles which brought freedom to this nation in 1776, and so recently have found renewed expre..<sion in the
Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, India,
and Pakistan.
Mr. President. for the peoples of the
three associated states of Indochina,
success in this united endeavor will open
an era of liberty. They shall have the
OPPOrtunity to deal in their own way,
and In keeping with their own national
genius, with the accumulated ills of centuries past and the challenges of the
future.
This, then, !! I may repeat it, ts the
real purPOse of the struggle: the complete freedom of the three states of Indochina, Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia,
and their security from aggressive, totalitarian domination.
Mr. President, when I returned from
Indochina, last October, I reperted to
the Foreign Relations Committee and to
the Senate that a satisfactory solution
to the conflict was possible. I indicated
then that there were three essential elements In the solution: first, that the
French stay with the military situation
until such time as the Indochinese nationalists had gathered sufficient
strength to defend themselves; and further, that the French pursue a course
leading to the establishment of genuine
independence In the area; second, that
the United States continue to supply the
materials needed by the non-Communist forces, but refrain from committing
its own armed strength In the area;
third, that the three nationaJ.tst states
put down roots in their respective peoples and develop the wUl to fight for
freedom and the necessary popular supPOrt to gain it.
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Mr. President. why, first of all, Is It
necessary for the French military forces
to remain in Indochina for the present?
It is necessary for this reason, if none
other: their withdrawal at this time
would bring about the immediate collapse of nationalist resistance. Native
armies have not yet been formed that
can stand alone against the Communistled Viet Minh. The latter have been
building their military strength for
years, and arc heavily supported from
Communist China. Early in this struggle the Viet Minh Communists wrapped
themselves in the cloak of nationalism
and social reform, and so developed considerable popular support. This cloak,
although tattered by the obvious nature
of Chinese Intervention. still remains
relatively intnct. It will take time for it
to disintegrate. By the same token it
will take repeated assurances-deeds. not
words-to convince the people of Indochina that the nationalists. rather than
the Communists. really represent their
best Interests and their hopes for full
independence from colonial rule.
Until these two Ideas are firmly established-namely, that the Viet Minh
are the tools of International communism, while the nationalists represent
true freedom and national progressthe vast majority of the Indochinese
people at best will continue to sit on the
fence. At worst. they will actively oppose the national governments of the
three states. the French, and ourselves.
These are blunt and unpleasant words,
but the time has come to speak them.
French military support, then. is essential if resistance to communism in
Indochina Is to be maintained until the
nationalist governments are able to
stand on their own feet. So, too, is continued material support from this country. France, heavily committed in
Europe and elsewhere. cannot alone bear
this financial burden, or even a major
part of it. The national governments
or the three states do not begin to command the necessary resources. Without
our continuing material aid, as without
the French military c1Iort. the resistance
to communism in Indochina would collapse.
Without the determination of the Indochinese nationalist leaders to establish
themselves firmly in the hearts of their
people. the c1Iort In Indochina is also
doomed to eventual failure. It will not
be easy for some of these leaders so to
establish themselves. Many of them are
former ofllcials of the French colonial
system. Some are still French citizens.
Others have permitted their French
training to separate them from their
people rather than to equip them to help
their people. I do not condemn these
leaders for this state of affairs. I do
say, however. that the time has come for
them to lead; and if they are to lead
they must. be willing to work with and
through their people. The tides of nationalism arc sweeping through Indochina. They are powerful, irresistable
tides. Those who understand the tides,
those who do not. fear them, will sail with
them-and, in the long run, only those.
In this way lies the hope of rallying
popular support to the national govern-

ments of the three states. In this way
genuine national armies can be built
which will remain loyal to the cause of
these governments.
It these three elements-French military and political action aimed at Independence. continued aid from the United
States. and popular leadership on the
part of the national governments-had
been present in the past, we would be going into the Geneva conference with
high hopes for a successful termination
of the conftict. As it Is. we face that
conference under a threatening cloud of
appeasement.
What has gone wrong? Where docs
the failure lie? It does not lie ln the
French military effort. The French
Union forces in the area number 10 light
divisions of 240,000 men. Twenty-six
per cent of the commissioned officers of
France and 37 percent of the noncommissioned are serving in Indochina. The
French have lost 16,000 killed. Dien
Bien Phu is not a symbol of military defeatism. It is a symbol of the highest
courage and devotion to duty. The resistance of this isolated fort is in keeping with the finest tradition of the value
of French arms.
Nor does the failure lie in the faltering of American assistance. The flow of
aid has been stepped up steadily until
it now meets, at the least, all reasonable
demands of the French-Indochinese
forces. It covers three-quarters of the
total cost of the Indochinese war.
So great has been this aid that, in my
opinion, It has carried us to the brink of
full-scale involvement. We have sent
equipment. We have sent technicians.
We are even paying for General Chennault's private flyers to help supply the
resistance. Can we go much further
without war? I have never heard a serious complaint voiced on the inadequacy of American aid. I have never
heard a serious opinion advanced to the
effect that the inte1·vention of American
combat forces, except on a massive scale,
would make a significant difference ln
the military situation in Indochina.
And I do not believe that there should
be such intervention. If the war In Indochina. is a part of the larger resistance
to totalitarian agg1·ession, the sacrifices
must be equitably borne by the free nations. We have curled ow· share of the
fighting in Korea. As the distinguished
majority leader has pointed out, we have
a right to expect others to carry theirs
in this conflict.
As it is now, the anti-Communist
armed forces total more than 500,000
men as against a Vletminh Communist
military strength, both regular and Irregular. which does not exceed 300,000
effectives. The Chinese Communists
ship these forces probably 5,000 tons of
supplies a month. for which, according
to reliable reports, they pay In opium
and raw materials. We ship the French
and the nationalist forces many thousands of tons more a month for which
they do not pay.
If it were a matter of mllltary aid
alone, this war would have long since
ended in victory. But it is not a matter
of American military aid alone, just as
it Is not a matter o:C the French milltary
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errort alone. The tendency to think of
the struggle in Indochina as a purely
military one has only served to obscure
the real source or the difficulty.
In my opinion, the failure lies not ln
the military but in the political realm.
We have lost sight of the fundamental
objective. If I may reiterate that objective. the only realistic objective. it Is
that the peoples of the Indochinese
states shall have a right to work out
their destiny in freedom. secure from the
threat or totalitarian domination.
Last July 3, the French announced,
In e1Icct. that independence for the
three states of Laos. cambodia, and Viet
Nam was their political objective in the
struggle In Indochina. Months have
gone by but the specific agreements to
carry out this pledge have yet to be negotiated except In the case of Laos.
I believe such agreements will eventu·
ally be reached but will they be reached
in time? Unless it Is clear that the
national governments of the three states
have a future that Is unequivocally free,
they will not really fight in this struggle.
M01·eover. without a clear-cut promise ot
full freedom. no native army is likely to
be formed in Indochina which can be
trusted not to go over to the enemy
once It has been trained and equipped
and the opportunity presents itself.
Without this promise, there will be
neither victory nor honorable peace in
Indochina.
From the French point of view. the
delay In reaching the agreements stems
primarily from the desire that the three
states remain within the French Union.
To this. I can only say that there is
no true union which is not based on the
equality and the free will of the partners.
I cannot believe that France, the spirit
of France which is one of the strongest
forces of liberty in the Western World,
would countenance for long any other
kind of union. I do not know if the
Indochinese states will elect to remain
In the French Union once they have obtained their freedom. I do know that if
they are compelled to remain against
their wish, they will make sorry part.
ncrs.
I may also point out that the entire
experience In the transition from colonialism to self-government since the end
of World w ar n clearly illustrates the
wisdom of permitting a free choice in
this matter. Our bonds with the Philippines have never been more secure or
Intimate than they are today. The present relations between Britain and Pakistan and India are on a level of coopera•
tion and cordiality that was never
matched during the era of colonial coer·
c1on. If there is any lesson to be learned
from these experiences. it is that the
good which exists in the ties between a
colonial country and a holding power Is
heightened and made more enduring in
freedom and equality. It these rights
are denied a colonial country beyond the
time or their ripening, then the good 1n
the ties will be lost in a passion of mutual hatred and resentment.
The desire for national freedom and
equality is real In Indochina today. It
finds expression in the nationalism ~hat
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i~ now surging through the area. In In Washington on March 22, Is quoted a.s
my repOrt to the Poretgn Relations Com- .stating that "the French are going to
wm. It Is a ft~ht that Is going to be finmltt<-E: last October, I said:
'!'he probltm tor :t•rnnce and. In an Indirect Ished wtth our help." If this Is a correct
..,ru:c, for ounelvee, to to treat with thl$ quot.at•on. then I am compelled to ask,
po!ltl~:>l r~llty Jof natlonnllsrnl In a manWhat about the Indochinese people? Is
ncr which wllllnsure that full Independence, this simply a war which concerns us and
one" l\Chlevtd, wlll not lmmrdlntely be nul- the French, and In which the people
lified In the onrwh of tnternatlonl\1 com- whose country is beinc four:ht over nre
munism. It Ia a problem that hNI both
relegated to the sideline~? Jf there are
morl\1 and practical nspectl. This country
ls committed by bellt•f, tradition. and prac- too many inappropriate statements like
tlcn to pollclrs of supporting the right to this one, the Indochlnc•e wtll, lndred,
sclf·£O'crnm•nt of J~Ople able and •llllng rrmam on the ~idehnt' and l!'nve the
to u.ume the reopon£ll>llltl~ of sel! ·govern- stru!<r.le to us. If they do so. the enti1 e
ment. Mural nspec\6 apart, fl\llure to utlllzo moral justification of ow· participation
the lndiEenous powt'r Inherent In natlonal- will collapse.
i$JI1 ntt'rely IN\es to tnrren.&e 1mmeaaurably
We have siven our military aid unthe <"OSt to ourachcs Rnd to Franet- of preveutnlg tb(• Communtetr. from selztng Indo .. stintincly in Indochina. We have sent
chlnu and It could even throw the entire our technicians. But we have not yet
spoken clearly and succinctly of our J>Olso;ue Into doubt.
lttJcal obJecllvc:. in thi' area. Secretary
The failure ~o far to rcnch agreement Dulles has said that we would prev<>nt
ln Paris on the terms of run indrpcnd- Indochina from falling to thr Commuencc iS a fuilure to understand fully the r..sts by united action. United action of
pOwer of uation.'\ll~m in this stru"rle whom? Of the Wes!Rrn Power, alone?
aramst communi~m. It results, In ef- Does the term "united action" include
fect. in the need for greater sacntlces Asian nations as well? Does it include
of French manpower and creatcr aid at least the Indochine'e people? If it
ftom the United States. It Is, however, does. it seems that their representatives
only a part of the politicul failure. In might have been invited to attend the
the same rrport last October, I al~o said: Geneva Conference. Such vague termlThe polltiCl\1 pr• bltms of the Associated nolopy can only serve to confuse the
StMts will not end with the achle•ement Issue in Indochina and the cfl'ot·t which
of full Independence. • • • 'l'he basic prOb· ls beiM made to keep the reflton out of
Jcm which confronts all thrtt governments
And particularly that of Vlttnnm Is to put the hands of Communist tyranny.
The administration has never yet
down firm rooi.S In their uspecuve popu·
lations. Tht·y will be nble to do so only l! made clear in uneqmvocal terms, moreth<y evolve In accord with populnr senti· over, "hether or not this country seeks
ment and If they deal compttently with the full independence of the three As.~o
such basic probleiNl as I! literacy. public ciated States. It has hinted at this as
health. exceulve population In the deltas, our policy. It has inferred this as our
lnequtt!es In lnbor nnd land tenure. and policy. But It has never stated In clearvlllage and a.~rlcult.ural lmpro' ement.
l'lnnl!y, It lo cuentlal that there be a eon- cut lancua~;e thnt thi.• Is our pOlicy.
I was much tmpres.,td by the remarks
atnot raising of tht ethlcl\1 standards of
government and a determination to \I&C the of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mt·.
arml,.s. now tn U1c )>roc~sa or torm••tlon. KENNEDY J who said in his admirable
et.rlctty for national rather than prlvo.te pur- speech on this subj~t a few days aeo:
posea. Failure In theoe fund:>mentnl reThe time to study. to doubt, to review, and

sponolbllltlcu of self-government wlll result
In the achievement or the shadow rather
than the aubetance of Independence.

It ls generally ncknowlcdged, I am
sorry to say, that there has been fnllure
in this re>pect on the part of some of
the Indochmcse Nationalht leaders. It
would not be appropriate for me to discuss the personalities in other governments. Yet. competent ob.<ervers in
Indochina, have pOinted repeatedly to
the mistrust of the people or Indochina
for some or the National!st leaders.
There is apparently considerable feeling
that they do not represent the aspirattons of the ordmary people and that
they are concerned not with the problrm.s of the ordinary people but only
With their own welfare, protlt, and pleasure. Some have nlso slipped into a pattern of petty factionalism, which in the
end may dcstroy them.
H 1 may be blunt, I do not believe that
the Nationnlists have seriously begun to
undercut the strenrth of the Communist
movement bccau~c they have not yet sertously begun to 1·espond to the needs of
their people.
I hnve ~puken of the political failure of
the French nnd o! the Indochinese leaders. I speak now of our own. The Chief
of Stafr or our Armed Forces, 5peaking

revtse • • • 1s now.

Thls I~ the thought. which has moved
me to speak today. li have reviewed what
I believe to be the failures which have
led us and other free nations to the impas$e at which we now find ourselves.
Only a few days remnln before the Geneva Conference. 1f we go into that
Conferrnce wtthout chnnge in the present state of atfalrs, the most we can hope
for is a pOstponement of the crisis which
sooner or later must be faced. At worst,
we can expect an unmitigated disaster.
Out of this Conference may come a. truce.
which will insure ultimate communist
control or Indochina with all that implies for our own seeunty and the security or other free nations.
Out of this conference may come a
major upheaval in the Internal pOlitical
structure of France. Out of this conference may come the collap$e of all
plans for the united defense o! Western
EuropP. Out of thi~ conference mny
come, m the L'l't analysis, world war III.
There may still be a chance before the
Geneva meetinf! for the free nations to
~tand up succt'SSfully In this crl~is.
They must make cle~•r once and for all
what this strof!gle in Indochina means.
They must demonstrate that they are
engaged In a truly "united action," not
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on behalf of a single nation or group of
nations, but on behalf of freedom .
What Is needed now ls nction along
the following lines:
First. Declaration by the French that
their sole purpOse In Indochina Is to
secure the full national independence of
the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos:
Second. Endorsement or this declaration by the United States and other free
nallons:
Third. R!'sumptlon of ne"otiations In
Paris or Salf(on to set a date for the full
independence or all three of the assoCiated state~:
Fourth. Establishment or the machinery tor the progressive transfer of full
sovereignty to the three states, including
opt1onal arrangements to permit the
Indochine"c to remain In the French
Unoln only It they so elect:
Fifth. Appointment of three srparate
United States Ambn.<Sadors or Ministers
to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos;
Sixth. Con venin!( of constituent pOlitical assemblies In the three Indochinese
States wit.h a view to reorganizing their
governments on the basiS of more J>OPUJar representation;
Seventh. Relinquishment of French
cimenship by all national!st leaders now
holding such citizenship.
Action along these lines does not constitute a panacea for the situation in
Indochina. It docs not guarantee a.
cheap, an easy, or a quick way out of the
morass. Totalitarian commumsm Is
strom• in Asia and will not yield ca.~ily to
the forces of freedom. Action nlong
these lines. however, can prevent the
Geneva Conference from ending in disaster. It can clarify the obJectives of
the struggle in Indochina. It can lay
the groundwork for a legitimate and respOnstble consideration of the situation
by the United Nations.
This may be the last chance ln Indo·
china. The time to take It iS now.
Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr.
President, will the Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. I commend the Senator from Montana for his
very frank statem~>nt and for the moderate pOSition he takes. I should like to
ask him one question.
Jn the Geneva. Conference do we not
face two grave danger.;? SupJlOiiC the
Soviets and the Indochine~c Communists
advocate the steps which the Senator
hlm.~elf has propOSed as being wt~e for
us to take today, and they are acted upon
favorably. Does that not drive the
Indochinese Nationalists and all the
other grouPS In Indochina Into the hands
of the Communl.st.~? would they not
then regard the Communists as their
close friends? Is that not one of the
grave danr.ers?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am ~re the Senator from Colorado is correct. If there
should be a negotiated truce or tettlement, I do not see how anyone but the
Communists could win, no matter how
1t looks at the present time.
Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Doe8 not
that make lt all-impOrtant that our po-
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sltlon be completely clarified prior to the
opening of the Geneva Conference?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I could not possibly agree more than I do v.-lth the senator's statement.
li:-.:ITED S't.\TES PJtOT'&CI'S AND DDI"L""''DS COLONIAL
SLAVERY

1\Ir. MALONE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. MALONE. First, I should like
to congratulate the Senator on bringing
the subject before the Senate.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am not the tl.rst
one to bring it before the Senate.
Mr. MALONE. Following the statement of the senator from Massachusetts
1:\fr. KENNEDY I of a few days aqo. I
should like to ask the Senator this
question: What would be our position
In Indochina if we send our troops there
nnd 1t resulted In an all-out war? How
long could our troops remain there?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Once a decision
has been made, it Is up to us all, regardless of party, to support the decision. If
we become Involved In Indochina, there
Is a 50-50 chance, In my opinion, that
ned China will become Involved In Indochina. too. and that also Red China will
once again reopen the Korean struggle.
Then we shall be on the mainland of
Asia. whether we like It or not, and the
net result may well be tl:at we may not
only be engaged In a war for a long. long
t1me. but in the meantime, «.>vcn Western Europe. Its industrial potential as
well as its people, will fall prey to Communist aggression.
Mr. MALONE. There Is no doubt. I
suppose. in anyone's mind that Red
China Is behind the war In Indochina at
this time.
Mr. MANSFIELD. None at all.
Mr. MALONE. If Russia should officially enter the conflict. and we should
send our men to Indochina. as we sent
them to Korea, even If we were winning,
how long does the Senator think we
could keep our men on the Asian mainland?
M1·. ::I.!ANSFIELD. I would not know
how long: no one can an~wer that question. I will say to the senator.
Mr. MALONE. I should !Ike to say
to the distinguiShed Senator that many
m111tary strategists think we could not
t·ven get our men out or Indochina.
We could neither feed them nor get
them out. They would be prisoner:;,
dead. or on the way to the salt mines
In a relatively short time.
Mr. 1\!A.NSFIELD. At the present
t1me it would be a physical Impassibility
for the French to withdraw from Indochina. becau~ the roads from Hanoi
con5ist of one rail line and one highway.
We could not get troops away !rom
there. because we could not get sufficient means to transport them. That
Is one of the chances we take and why
It Is impassible at the present ume for
the French to withdraw.
Mr. MALONE. It 1:;, of course, an
Impassibility. If an all-out war should
start, our boys would be either prl:;oners
of war or be cut to pieces.
I should also like to ask the Senator
from Montana this question: Have there
been any Indications that the French are

fighting for anything except to hold a
colonial pos~sston? If there should be
an aU-out war, and we should fight and
finally win, France would expect to get
back its colonial posse:s;lons, just as
England went back Into the Malayan
Stat~s after World War II.
Is there
any Indication thn t l~rance wishes to
free Indochina? Or docs she wish to
hold it as a colonial nation. with low
wage and living standards so that there
is a profit to the French?
l\1r. MANSFIELD. In my opinion,
there are indication!; that France wants
to give up Its colonial control of Indochina. and wants to pull out or that area.
The only thmg It would not like would
be the retention within the French Union
of the three Indochinese states. I think
the war Is costing the French so much,
in addition to what we have put into
It, that they are sicl: and tired of it.
AU they can see Is the continued loss of
men and money. I am convinced in my
own mind that, on the ba:;ls of the July
3 statement by France, she wnnts to give
these little nntlons their independence,
but she seems to be afraid to take the
final step which wlll guarantee victory
tor them In their tlght for the Independence of their own countries.
Mr. MALONE. I und«.>rstand the Senator was In Saigon during the past year.
Mr. MANSFIElD. I was there !or a
couple of weeks.
l\1r. MALONE. I was there In 1948. I
took occasion to go review a part of the
area, and I saw many of the Nationalists.
We have every reason to believe that the
situation has not materially changed.
We are givmg them. just as we are giving
every other colonial nation throughout
the world, the choice of communism or a
continuation of their colonial status.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It Is a choice between communism and freedom.
Mr. MALONE. That Is not evident. I
ask the distinguished Senator If he can
refer us to any document Indicating that
the French are offering them freedom.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I pointed out in my
speech the fact that an agreement has
been reached betwe«.>n them and the Republic of France. According to Information coming from respOnsible Cambodians, they are about 80 percent along
the way toward an agreement. Negotiations are in progress, and duties have
been turned over to them which for~erly
were performed by the French.
Mr. MALONE. I know of no agreement at this time. and there Is none in
prospect, except one which would hold
Indochina as some kind of a satellite
nation, contlnutn~: to contribute to the
support of the French nation.
Mr. :MANSFIELD. No: I would not use
that term. I believe the French will give
them full Independence. It they want to
come back into the French Union, that
is their responsibility.
Mr. MALONE. Is there any a!lreement
that It they do not want to remain in the
French Union they do not have to do so?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not at the present
time. I should not be sm-prlsed If such
an agreement is being serious considered.
Mr. MALONE. It takes more to surprise the Senator than It docs to surprise
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me. I f'hould be very much surprisod tc
they are otrered anything except some
kind of n deal which would result In
France continuing to receive an income
from Indochina.
When the Atlantic Pact was signed I
said on this Sem\te floor In debate. '"What
we are dolnl{ Is guaranteeing the intet::rity of the colonial system throughout
the world." That was denied. But we
were agreeing to go to war when the
empire-minded nations. England, France,
Netherlands. and Belgium were In war.
we have no control over their actions and
they would go to war to protect theh·
colonial systems. In protecting their
colonial systems they claim they are
fighting communism.
The colonial nations never have been
given a choice to become entirely independent. We have not said that they
should have Independence. Did I not
underst:md the Stnator to say that we
as a nation had not made our position
clear?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is entitled to his own opinion, but so far as
the NATO agreement Is concemed, It
does not apply to colonial areas· it applies to the home countries.
'
Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield for a question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield tor a question.
Mr. MALONE. Has the Senator heard
of any of those areas Into which we have
gone to protect t-Ither England. Belgium,
or France that have received any freedom from their colonial status? Have
they not sent troops In to protect theh·
possessions?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I know of no In·
terventlon In the Belgian Congo or In
Malaya or any other place--Mr. MALONE. There was a war In
Malaya. We conquered the Japanc..>e
people anct the English moved back in
and are continuing the same colonial
domination-continuing to dominate the
production and trade just the same as
France has done In Indochina !or 100
years.
Is it not time that we define our ob-

jective~?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish
to commend my distinguished colleague
from Montana for the very tine contribution he has made here today. This
is not the first contribution he has made
in connection with a thorough, adequate
discussion of conditions in Indochina.
I desire to say to my distinguished
colleague that It seems to me that all thl~
discussion points up the necessity of
the administration. through the President of the United States, coming to
Congress and defining not only the Immediate problems, but also the longrange problems, which confront us in
Indochina.
The distinguished Senator from Montana has pointed out very effectively today the Immediate needs and also the
long-range requirements with which we
are confronted. I think the Senate as a
body will stand behind the President
of the United States. It Is difficult, however, to know where we are to stand it we
do not know what t~e policy is.
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I wish to take the opportunity once
again to commend the Senator upon his
distinguished contribution and upon his
effort to try to solve this critical problem.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator !rom Washington.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
MARTIN in the chair). Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator
from Tennessee?
l".U. MANSFIELD. I yield, provided I
do not lose my right to the fioor.
Mr. GORE. I have followed very
closely the provocative and able address
delivered by the junior Senator from
Montana. I underscored two sentences
of the Senator's speech, in order that I
might later make inquiry of him with
respect thereto. I read from his speech,
as follows:
U Is clear, now. that the administration
believes our strategic stake In Indochina Is
very great.

I wish to say to the able Senator from
Montana that I certainly agree with him
that for us the stakes are great.
The next sentence I v.•ish to read is
this:
It Is also clear that we have been committed very deeply In Indochina, probably
even to tile extent o! military action by
American !orccs.

By what process does the able Senator
from Montana think we have been committed thus deeply?
Mx. MANSFIELD. I may say to the
Senator from Tennessee that the only
information I get is what I read in the
newspapers or what I happen to hear.
What I am about to say not only appeared in a column in yesterday's newspaper but I heard it a week or so ago,
and it was to the effect that the leadership of the Senate and the House, and
the ranking members of the Committees
on Al·med Services. had met with Mr.
Dulles and Admiral Radford. and that at
one of the meetings two possibilities were
raised.
The first was the possibility known as
limited action, which supposedly had to
do with sending planes from carriers in
the region of Indochina.
The other possibility was the adoption
of a resolution authorizing the President
of the United States to take such action
as might be necessary.
The first of these limited actions, of
course, if what I heard was true, would
mean our actual involvement.
People can talk all they wish about our
air support and air strikes, but any time
such action is taken, it will not be long
before the foot soldier will have to move
in.
So far as the resolution possibility is
concerned, if there was such a proposal,
I think that if such a resolution should
be agreed to. it would mean the abdication of responsibility by Convress, ~md
I should be very much opposed to it. I
think Congress ought to be informed,
and informed minutely, of events as they
are developing.
Mr. GORE. Is the Senator from Montana in a position to be more explicit

about the resolution to which he has
made reference?
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I have just
heard rumors about it. I could not give
a::1y definite information about it. I
know, for example, that it appeared in a.
newspaper column in the Washington
Post and Times Herald of yesterday, but
I have no reference to the column which
mentioned it. I picked up the information about 4 or 5 days or a week ago.
I do not know whether it is true or false.
That is why I have called it a rumor.
Mr. GORE. I hope the Senator from
Montana realizes that when I submit
ihe~e inquiries, I do not wish to appear
unduly critical either of him or of the
administration at this critical time. I
should like to know if the able Senator
from Montana considers that when the
President of the United States makes a
public statement. public to the world,
that the United States cannot afford to
permit Communist domination of the
Indochina Peninsula, the integrity of the
United States of America is put at stake
before the eyes of the world.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is
correct. I should say in reply that there
are various ways in which the assertion
by the President could perhaps be answered.
Mr. GORE. If we, the United States,
are committed so deeply as the able
junior Senator from Montana seems to
think that we are, does he not believe
it is time for the administration to reconsider the 30-percent reduction In the
budget for the United States Army? If,
indeed, we are teetering on the brink of
another war, is now the time to make
drastic reductions In the size of the
United States Army and Marine Corps,
and to "mothball'' ships of our Navy?
Just how does the so-called New Look
policy fit into the more recently announced policies of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles?
Mr. MANSFIELD. As the Senator
knows. if it comes to more extensive
commitments, there will be no New Look,
as such; although really I do not know
what the New Look .is. It has the earmarks of things which happened during the time when Louis Johnson was
Secretary of Defense, and the Nation was
said to have had so much strength that,
as a result, If anyone had attacked us
at 4:45 in the morning, we would have
been able to wipe them otf the face of
the globe by 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
That did not work out, but I am quite
certain the administration at present
must be reappraising the situation, both
from a political and a military standpoint, so that in the event of an emergency they will be able to revise the
figures which have been given to Congress to date.
Mr. GORE. I should hope that that
would be the case. Certainly, if the
United States faces imminent danger,
as I believe it does, then this is not the
time to make drastic reductions in oux
national defense.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the
Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr HUMFHREY. First, I wish to join
with other Senators who have already
been engaged in colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Montana, in
commendation for his very statesmanlike address: Indeed, one which poses
the whole problem, both political and
military, as it pertains to Indochina and
our relationships to this area.
I hold in my hand a copy of the Senator's address. On page 18 I notice
with considerable interest the Senator's
comments concerning the military
strength of the opposing forces in Indochina. Therefore. I wish to ask the Senator 1 or 2 questions.
Is it not true that the forces of the
Associated States and the French Union
in the Indochina area arc far superior
in manpower to the communist forces
of the Viet Minh, as the Senator has
noted in his address?
Mr. MANSFIELD. They are supericr,
not only in manpower, but in war materiel as well.
I would be willing to make the assertion that no general in all the history
of France has had at his disposal the
amount of material which General Navan·e has at his disposal today.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The point I wished
to have the Senator from Montana develop was that there is not only a ratio
of about 5 to 3 in manpower; namely,
more than 500,000 men in the forces of
the Associated States and the French
Union, as compared with 300,000 for the
Communist Viet Minh forces; but also
that the Associated States and French
Union forces have much better equipment, and in larger quantities, by far,
than do the Communist forces.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
Minnesota is correct. As I understand,
5,000 tons of supplies a month arc coming from China over the border into
Indochina, to assist the Communist-led
Viet Minh. I understand that the total
amount of supplies, Including American
aid, being shipped to the forces of the
Associated States Union is in the vicinity
of 50,000 tons a month, indicating, in
contrast to the 5-to-3 proportion, so
far as combat etrectives are concerned, a
ratio of 10 to one so far as war materiel
is concerned.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not true that
the communist forces are without naval
power
Mr. MANSFIELD. They have none at
all.
Mr. HUMPHREY. They have little or
no airpower?
Mr. MANSFIELD. They have none.
Mr. HUMPHREY. And the French
have a substantial fleet, or at least naval
forces in the area, and a very substantial
air force, have they not?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is conect.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The pw·pose of my
questions is to point out that. as I see
it, there is a great deal of manpower in
the area, organized into combat or operational units. In other words, there are
significant numbers of organized manpower; secondly, there is an organized
navy and air force on the part of the
Associated States and the French Union.
I ask these questions only to detail fur-
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ther the documentation of the remarks
or the Senator from Montar.a. The central problem the Senator has mentioned
and touched and elaborated on Is the
political problem or the psychological
problem. is it not?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That Is correct.
Mr. HUMPHREY. It Is In dealing with
that problem, as stated by the senator
from Montana, that the Senator believes
we have been less effective, Is It not?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I notice the senator from Montana said, In the earlier
part of his address. speaking now of the
problems which pertain both to the military and political questions In Indochina,
that It Is not clear that these conditions
are even understood by the administration.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That Is correct.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator
recall li~tenlng to Admiral Radford and
other officials of our Government pointIng out the effective parts of the Navarre plan as It pertains to m1lltary
opemtlons?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Without going Into
any of the details, which were explained
to us In executive session. does the Senator really believe that the Navarre plan
can be successful as a military plan unlcs.~ the political considerations the Senator from Montana has outlined In his
address are fulfilled?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Neither the Navarre plan, the Dulles plan. nor any
other plan. Is going to be fulfilled unless
two COJldltlons are met, In Vietnam
principally, but throughout the Associated States as well. First, there must
be competent. respected leadership. The
second Is what I call, from my Marine
Corps expetience, an esprit de corps
among the Vietnamese Army and the
Vietnamese population. It Is essential
that those people believe In themselves
nnd In their own liberty and Independence. It they do, with the right kind of
leadership they will win without any
troops or any other help being sent.
They are fightln~~: their brothers. but
their brothers fight with some determination. and the Vietnamese lack such determination. There ls no reason why,
given independence, given the right to
decide theil· own leadership, they could
not win. because once that Is assured,
It will be found that a great proportion
of the Vietnamese population will get off
the fence and on the right side.
Mr. HUMPHREY. It Is true, Is It not,
that the real weakness has bE·en, first,
thl' uncertainty as to the meaning or the
French political declaration and the follow throu~: h?
Mr. ~IANSFIELD. That Is correct.
Mt·. HUl\1PHREY. Secondly, the
weakness has been the lack of decisive
leudership, particularly on the part of
Bao Dtu in Vietnam, and, of course. In
the other Associated States. and the failure or the United States Government, In
its aid program, which, by the way,
nmounts to over $1 billion a year. to
mnke it clear to the Indochinese that
this military help Is not for the purpose
of assisting French colonialism or anybody else's colonialism, but !or the pur-

pose which the Senator from Montana
has stated. to raise the .standard of freedom. grant free choice to the Associated
States to be either In the Prench union
or out of the French union. and to be
tree and Independent. Would not the
Senator say those nrc the areas of weakness and Indecisiveness'?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator has
made a correct statement. The element
or leadership is needed. It Is necessary
that those people believe ln their own
freedom, and demonstrate an ability and
will fight for it. The ultimate answer
Is not going to be found in French forces
and American aid; it Is going to be found
In the will and determination of the
Vietname:;e. They will either win or lose
their own freedom , regardless of what
we may do.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Will any of the
natives of Indochina ever believe that
there Is sincerity in the o«er of freedom
and Independence so long as there Is In
existence a military trnlnlng program.
for example, which excludes natives of
Indochina from officer rank, and does
not permit them to build up a noncommissioned officer corps nnd obtain leadership ln a military sense? Is It not true
that the French insist on holding to a
military program which excludes native
trooPS from all positions of command?
Mr. Z...1ANSFIELD. That Is partially
correct. I understand there Is a new
French training command to which at
the present time two American officers
have been attached. and that the commander will proceed to Include natives
In such training. I also understand,
from reading the newspapers about a
week ago, that the ChiE'f of Stnte. Bao
Dal, and the Vietnamese Chief of Staff,
General Hinh. attended the graduation
ceremonies at the military academy at
Dalat, at which some 600 platoon leaders, captaius, and majors, were graduated.
So. if I may, I should like to say to
say to the Senator from Minnesota that
In that respect it seems that something
Is being done to relieve the difilculty the
Senator has mentioned.
Mr. HUMPHREY. A very belated
effort.
Mr. MANSFIELD. True. but better
late than never. In point of time.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Would lt not seem
important and desirable In the prelimInary negotiations being conducted prior
to the Geneva Conference, that the Secretary of state. Mr. Dulles, have it pretty
clear in his mind tha t the Senate of the
United States-or at least a substantial
number of the Member::. of the Senatefavors and SUPPOrts freedom and independence for the Associated States of
Indochina and the ri ght of those people
to determine their own future?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, that Is true;
and I would venture to assume that he
does know it and that he is perhaPS
working along that line.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from
Montana has always been a very constructive and helpful member or the Government of the United States. I hope
our Secretary of State docs know the
feelings of the Senate; but I must say to
the junior Senator f rom ...1ontana that
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Jn some private conversations I have had,
even as of this date, with resPOnsible offleers of the Government, I am not at all
convinced that the position of our Government Is one of complete freedom and
Independence for Indochina.
I am of the opinion that our Govern~
ment, while It has not officially declared
Its position, has back In the recesses of
its official mind, the attitude that Indo~
china may not be quite ready for independl.'nce. and that it may take a ion~
time for the people of Indochina to bt•
ready for Independence. My comment Is
that whether they are ready or not, they
should be given it. They are not going to
have their Independence until somebody
guarantees It to them. It we are going to
be spending American money and usln~
American material. plus getting close to
further Involvement in Indochina, we
ought to back what we do with our word
for independence.
I am disturbed over what the Senatot•
has stated and over what other Members
of this body have said about a lack of
clarity on the part of our hlgh military
and State Department officials In makinr:lt clear that this country does stand for
independence and for complete freedom
of these states. One cannot play both
sides of the street on this question. We
cannot tamper with the question: we
have to be definite about lt. It the Senator from Montana has any information
which he can give to the senate that the
position of our Government Is !or unequivocal Independence, the Members of
the Senate should know it. It the senator has such Information, I wish he
would state it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am unable to give
the Senator the assurance he has requested along that line, and I know of
his great Interest In that aspect of the
subject: but I wish to express the opinIon that Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of
State, has undoubtedly been reading or
hearing about speeches made by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY I,
and the statements and speeches made
by the majority leader, which all indicate
an interest In the freedom of the Associated States of Indochina. I am quite sure
Mr. Dulles Is enough of a Secretary or
State, enough of a statesman, and enough
of a graduate of this deliberative body
to be fully aware of what is going on; and
I would assume he would be acting accordingly.
When Mr. Dulles returns, I assuml'
that at some time he will appear be!on·
our committee: and then we shall havt.>
a chance to ask him questions and to
have his position set down In black and
white, Instead of basing it upon assumptions which seem to differ insofar as the
senator from Minnesota and myself are
concerned.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. Let me ~ay
I am not beln~ critical of the Secretary
of State. I think too many of our Secretaries of Stnte have been harassed almost beyond human endurance.
When the Democratic administration
was In power. the Government of the
United States dragged its feet for months
on the question of Independence !or Indonesia, and there still remain in the
State D·~partment a group who believo
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the Dutch should have sovereignty over
Indonesia. In Indonesia we arc still
paying for that situation, despite the
fact that the President of that Republic,
Dr. SOekarno, Is friendly to the United
States.
In the midst of the last war, despite
our being an ally of Great Britain and
despite the fact that Churchlll said he
would not preside over the liquidation
of the British Empire, the Government
or the United States made it unequivocally clear that the United States was in
favor of independence for India, Mr.
Churchill notwithstanding.
So I think It is about time that we
reinind a few other people that we are
In favor of their independence. The
French and the British may not like it;
but the American people will not like it,
either. unless we watch out very carefully what we do and make our position
definite and certain.
I wish to commend the Senator from
Montana for his basic recommendations,
which, Indeed, are sound and comprehensive in scope, and offer a pro~:ram of
action. We are greatly Indebted to him.
I believe we must also be careful to
make sure that we continue to carry on
the tradition of freedom of our country.
We were the first to recognize the independence of the State of Israel; It did
not take us long to do so. We finally
recognized the Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, and we called for
the Independence of India. We were
the first to call for the independence of
the Latin American Republics from the
powers of the Old World.
In the case or Indochina we have been
engaging in slow motion. It Is about
time we made our political position clear.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Montana yield to me,
for a question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. Let me preface my
question by quoting one sentence from
the speech the Senator from Montana
bas made:
It will ~ too Ia te. In short, to keep Indochina from fnlllng or slipping Into the net of
Communist totalitarianism, or. perbap•. this
country from an ~qually dlsa.strou• full-scale
military Involvement In the confl1ct.

and in particular I do not w~h to embarrass him on the eve of the Geneva Conference. But at the same time, does the
Senator from Montana feel that the people of the United States, and especially
the Members of Congress. arc being prepared by being given sufficient facts as
a. basis for their thinking and to enable
them to obtain a grasp of the situation,
so as to be able to m('et such a suggestion
as the one described by the Senator from
Montana In the sentence I have just
Quoted from his speech.
Mr. MANSFIELD. So far as Congres.o;
is concerned. I think there is a great deal
more knowledge of the situation than Is
the case throughout the Nation as a
whole. Of course that is understandable, because some of us have been interested for some time in Indochina,
and others of us are kept In fairly constant touch with conditions and events
there. But throughout. the country \VC
find that the people generally do not
understand the potentials In connection
with this struggle. and I am afraid a
good many of them do not understand
what our contribution has been or what
Its possible effect upon us may be.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I feel that the
people generally have not been sufficiently Informed. and that there is a
strong sentiment against our taking any
steps in the conflict. unless more Is
known about what we are going into and
what the possibilities are as we go into
it, and about the need for Intervention
by us. as well as the need for intervention by the other nations of the free
world.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.
Mr. STEm"'s. I think more statements on this very subject should come
from the administration side of the aisle.
In my opinion, the best statement that
has been made on it was the impromptu
one. made about a week ago by the Senator from California [Mr. KNowx.ANDI,
the majority leader, when he said that
whatever we did toward going into Indochina, he wanted It understood that.
there would have to be more than token
assistance. that there would have to be
a bona fide contribution, and that it
would have to· be understood from the
beginning that a bona fide effort would
be made to carry It out.
Those are also my sentiments, Mr.
President.
As the basis for another question, I
should like to quote a sentence from a
paragraph In the text of the United
States-British statement. as carried by
the Associated Press under date of
Aprill3:

Mr. President, from the experience of
the Senator from Montana as a Member of Congres.o;. and presently as a.
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and from what I know about his
Intense personal interest In this subject,
I think he speaks on it with knowledge
and authority, and I know he speaks with
Accordingly. v:e arc ready to take part \\Cith
sincerity. From that sentence In his the otber countries principally concerned In
speech I judge that he thinks we are an examination oC the posslblllty ot estnbapproaching a state of facts that could Jisblng a collective defen><'. within the
involve us in a full-scale military in- framework or the Charter or the United Navolvement in this confliCt. In that con- tions Organization. to assure t.he peace. security. and freedom of southeast Asia and
nection I wish to ask him a question.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Let me say to the the western Paclflc.
Senator from Mississippi that I think
Mr. President. let me say that I am
we are approaching a conference preg- glad to see, as the basis for that statenant with possibilities.
ment, that a united effort will really
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
mean an effort on the part of the other
Based on the background I have just free nations, and that we are not going
recited. let me ask a question, without to act alone or be expected to act alone,
being in the least critical of Mr. Dulles, or to carry more than our fair share
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of the burden. I think that is the primary point l."l which the people of the
United States arc interested, as they attempt to obtam the facts. I commend
Mr. Dulles for making bls statement and
taking that position, so as to have a clear
understanding now of the basis on which
we may proceed.
I shall be glad to have the Senator
from Montana comment on that point.
Mr. MANSFIELD. As I understand,
the note calls for an examination seeking
to establish an organization, within the
framework of the United Nations, which
very likely would be a Pacific pact for
southeast. Asia or a southeast pact based
on NATO.
Of course, Mr. President. examinations
take a long time. Perhaps we do not
have time to work out such an agreement.
I am glad to see that the term "united
effort" has replaced the term "united action," because a "united effort.. can mean
a number of things. That Is a good step.
To my knowledge, there have been in troduced, during the past 4 or 5 years,
in both the Senate and the House or
Representatives, bills seeking to establish a Pacific pact. But as of the present date, nothing has been done to implement those suggestions.
Although the suggestion now made
seems to be new, it really is not new, for
it has received serious consideration by
Congress, or at least by congressional
committees, during the past 4 or 5 years.
A crisis is required to bring it. to a head.
The result will be that Mr. Dulles will
come back and say, "We have won a victory. We are to have a SOutheast AsiaPacific Pact, or a SOutheast Asia NATO
alliance." Let us hope it works out. It
has been a long time coming. Personally I shall have to see more than a statement signed by the Foreign Minister of
Great Britain and Mr. Dulles before I
will have much confidence in it. because
I am sure that perhaps many things are
being agreed to in principle in a hurry at
this time in order to build up a false
front before the Geneva conference. I
do not happen to be from Missouri, but
I have to be shown. Agreements that
can be arrived at in a day or so between
the foreign ministers of various governments ordinarily do not mean very much.
I do not. want something to be done
merely for the record, only to find out
after Geneva that it. does not mean a
thing.
Mr. STENNIS. I certainly would not
take an unyielding position against a socalled Pacific pact, but I shall oppose a
mere paper pact.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Nor would I oppose
a Pacific pact. I have been in favor of it
for a long time.
Mr STENNIS. However. I think we
ought to make It clear that it should not
be merely a paper pact--not merely
something that looks good on paperbut that it must be one which represents
all-out effort, and all-out v. illinl(ne:;s on
the part of those most directly concerned, those closest to the danger. I do
not want the result to be that we shall
be underwriting the entire venture ourselves. My point is that we cannot.
spread and extend ourselves further and
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carry out such commitment.<. and at the
same timP protect ourselves at home. We
mtght as well admit that at the start.
Mr. MANSFIELD. We have neither
the manpower nor the resow·ces to carry
out commitments in all parts of the
world when anything happens. Here we
arl'. pt>rhaps for the fourth time in 4 decades. facing a situation which may call
upOn us to send our sons again to fight
in n foreign land. I do not want to see
that happen; and I believe It can bo
avoided. I think the answer lies in developing the states of Indochina as
wholly free. giving them a resoonsibility,
lettln;r them decide whether they will
remain unto themselves. or become parts
of the French Union. France must make
a decision in that connection. The result may well be disastrous if the right
decision is not made.
Before I take my seat I wish to join
with my good friend and able colleasue,
the Senator from Tennessee, In expressIng hill'h respect for the statements made
on the Indochina situation during the
course of the debate by the distinguished
majority leader £Mr. KNoWLANDl, who
has made a real contribution. He has
been fair. He has understood all the
implications, and I think we are extremely fortunate to have a man like
him in the chair he occupies at a time
like this
Mr. President, I yield the floor
Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I do
not intend to enter the general debate
this afternoon. I have listened with a.
great <leal of interest to the able remarks
of the Senator from Montana. On a.
previous occasion I listened to the speech
of the Senator from Massachusetts iMr.
KcNNcovl. I feel that the Senat-or from
Montana and the Senator from Massachusetts have made a. contribution to
the understanding of the Senate and the
country with respect to this very troublesome problem. which is fraught with
crave consequences in its full implications.
However. I wish to say that I believe
It is essential for our own Government
and our own people, as well as for those
with whom we have been associated in
the free world, to take a very realistic
viewpoint with respect to the developments which have taken place in Asia
and the developments which are now
ttl.king place in southeast Asia..
In view of the fact that the Secretary
of State has been carrying on some tmoortant negotiations with Her Majesty's
Government in London and the Government of the French Republic in Paris,
I would not wish to discuss at this time
either the statement which was Issued
jointly on behalf of Her Majesty's For~
elgn Secretary and the Secretary of
State. or the developments which have
taken place In Paris since our Secretary
of St..'l.te has been there.
Nor do I wish to make any statements
which would make more difficult the
very delicate and difficult task which
the Secretary of State will have at the
Geneva Conference, which is to begin on
the 26th of April.
However. I believe I may say.-and I
think It is impOrtant that it be saidNos. 68-69--s

that it strikes me as a little unrenllstlc,
the discussion of the posslblllty of a.
rough equivalent of a. NATO pact, that
mention was made of several countries,
all of which are imPOrtant, and by all
means should be Included if they desire
to be included In such a system of collective security, but that there seemed
to be a studious elimination of the Republic of KOrea and the Republic of
China on the Island of Formosa.
The fact of the matter Is that today
the Republic of Korea has In its armed
forces approximately 600,000 men, who
have been largely equipped and trained
by tbe Government and the people of
the United States. under the outstandIng leadership, first. of General Van
Fleet. and later of General Taylor. Not
only is the army of the Republic of Korea recognized as the fourth largest
standing army in the world, but perhaps
It would compare favorably with any
other standing army In the world today.
To be sure. logistically that small country cannot. In and of Itself, support that
very fine military force; but neither can
some of our European allies, without
logistical assistance from the United
States. So that fact Is no discredit to
the Republic of Korea.
On the island of Formos..'\ the Republic of China has roughly the equivalent
of half a million men. They have been
trained and, to a lesser degree than In
the case of the armed forces of Korea.,
have been equipped-pet·haps not so well
equipped as the forces of the Republic
of Korea, but at least they have been
equipped, and they are now being
equipped. That process Is being stepped
up. We have an excellent mission there
under General Chase. I have personally had an OPPOrtunity to visit training
camps both in Korea and In Formosa.,
and to study the condition of readiness
of the forces, as well as the morale. I
think they are both excellent forces.
When we consider that those two nations alone have more than 1,100,000
men in their armed forces-perhaps at
least 10 times as many as all the other
nations in Asia together, including Australia and New Zealand and the other
nations which have been mentioned as
possible participants In a Pacific pact-to me it is utterly unrealistic to conceive
that we could have an etrcctive collective security in the Pacific by counting
the Republic of Korea and the Republic
of China on Formosa out of the collective-security system.
I think we must keep In mind that
during the struggle In Koren, In which
the first overt act of aggression took
place since the close of World War II,
when the United Nations Organization
presumed to represent the desire of the
people of the world to have a system of
international law and order which would
preserve the peace of the world for ourselves and our children, and discourage
aggression, of the 60 members of the
United Nations. only 17 contributed a
single soldier, sailor, or airman to the
resistance against aggroesston in Korea.,
and all 17 of them together contributed
less than 45,000 In armed forces. compared with the contribution of this Nain

4831

tion alone, as I mentioned the other day,
of more than 450.000 at one time, as well
as the rotation in and out of Korea of
more than 1 million American troops.
I state again that I do not believe It is an
effective collective-security system, when
this Nation alone, of the United Nations
members. must bear 90 percent of the
manpower burden, and all the other
members of the United Nations willing to
contribute have contributed less than 10
percent.
I mention It because during the Korean
war, in 1950, after the aggression had
taken place, and when the United Nations Organization itself called UPOn the
free nations of the world to contribute
to the resistance or aggression In Korea,
some or those nations were a little slow
in coming forward with their contributions. Some of them came up very
readily and very quickly, and we should
appreciate the contributions which they
made. small though they were.
However. 4 days after the aggression
took place the Republic of China on
Formosa offered 35,000 of its best troops
with which to resist the aggression in
Korea.
At the Insistence of a number of nations. whom It Is not necessary to name
today, that offer was turned down by
the Government of the United States
and by the United Nations Organization,
even though the Republic or China. is a
charter member or the United Nations
Organization. I do not want to see that
mistake repeated.
If the time ever comes-and we all
hope it will never come-when the chips
are down In the Pacific, certainly it
would not make sense that 1,100,000
troops in the Fat· East, anti-Communist
in character, who are determined to
maintain themselves outside the Iron
Curtain, should be brushed aside and
treated almost as though they did not
exist, while we and other naticms talk
about a collective-security system in the
Pacific.
Of course, In order to be effectively
used, their use would have to meet with
the approval of the other governments,
all of whom are sovereign governments.
I am convinced, however. that if we
should get into trouble In the Pacific or
elsewhere. among our allies throughout
the world, Including those in Europe,
who are l'eliablc-and I think most of
them are reliable, although some of
them may not be-and others who are
reliable, such as Greece and Turkey, who
have given an outstanding demonstration of what they can do, with allied
help, in resisting aggression in Korea,
the little Republic of Korea and the
now reduced In size Republic of China
on Formosa would be able to render
valuable assistance.
Therefore, I hope that the prejudices
of Her Majesty·s Government, whatever
they may be, will not again be raised to
eliminate the prompt consideration of
the Republic of Korea and the Republic
of China. In connection with any pact of
the Pacific, because I have a. very deep
conviction that I! we eliminate those
two nations, which have more than
1,100,000 armed troops, we will indeed
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have In the Pacific a paper pact which
cannot be ell'ectlve In any degree.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.
Mr KENNEDY. I believe that In deciding which countries should join the
south Pacific or southeast Asia coalition, we must remember that the type
of aggression which Is going on In Indochma is not comparable to that which
occurred in Korea.
It is very unlikely, unless the United
Stat<'S GQvernment Intervenes actively
In Indochina, that the Chinese Communist.; will them<elvcs Intervene with
troops. Tile war Is alread~· colng In
the1r favor without their overt interventiOn, although they do assist the Indochinese Communists to a. substantial
decree.
It Is far more likely that the war will
continue to go as It has b<'cn going,
without overt Chlne~e aggression; and
the French will become more discouraged
and will refuse to make the political
concessions which would permit the
ralsmg of an effective native army.
'I1lerefore it seems to me that the conversations which are now going on with
respect to building a system of mutual
agreements for action In Indochina do
not approach the heart or the problem
at all. It is dubious-and I believe the
Senator will agree with me-that under
present condition.' the assistance he
mentions will be needed in Indochina.
What is needed far more to fight Commumst aggression in Indochina is an
effective native army to meet other nat •ve armies. Guarantees to come to the
aid of Indochina if the Chinese Communist armies across the northem frontier
are helpful, but are not the primary
requirements as of now.
I am concerned that. In secretary
Dulles• desire to build up a coalition
amon:; the Philippines, Thniland. New
Zealand. and Australia, we may lose
sight of the main problem, which Is the
ra1sing of an elrective native army in
Indochina.
This is, of course. a most dliDcult time
for Secretary Dulles. and I do not belie\·e
that any debate in the Senate should
raise questions to embarrass him in the
days to come. However, I hope that after the Geneva Conference Is concluded,
and after this diiDcult period Is past. we
m the Senate shall have an opportunity
to get a clear insight Into the nature of
the struggle and what the attitude of
the United States will be.
Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator from
Mas.~achusetts knows, from the colloquy
that took place on the tloor o! the Senate following h1s speech a wt-ek nco. that
the Senator from California fully agrees
that ell'ective resistance In the ASSOCIated States will not be forthcoming until the people of those states have been
assured of their full rh.:ht to determine
whether they will remain In the French
Union or withdraw from lt. It may well
be that if they were cranted Independence today they would at a Inter date
decide quite properly to associate themselves with France; but at least the
choice must be theirs to mak<'. Until
they can exercise such a. choice they

will not feel that they have the freedom
which they desire. and for which we,
having once cut ourselves free from
colonial ties. certainly ~hould have the
most sympathetic feeling.
Mr. KENNEDY. I o.m afra.id 'that
guaranties of outside countries will have
no appreciable effect on the struggle as
it is presently beinp,- waped.
Mr. KNOWLANO. I fully agree that
there must be the wlll to resist-and this
is true not only of southeast Asia, but is
a fundamental consideration--and any
government worthy of the name and any
people worthy of preservmg their freedom mu~t have their heart in the determination to maintain themselves outside the Communist Iron Curtain.
No matter how pawcrful their friends
abroad may be, unless people de<ire freedom and have the will to resist, their
resistance will not be eltect•ve, because
It is impassible to impart such desire and
will from anywhere else, whether it be
from a country In Europe or in Asia or
in the Americas. 'I1lerc must first be
that will to resist. When there is the
will to resist. the other nations who wish
to help maintain a free world of free men
can make a contribution to the cause of
tho~e people.
'I1lat applies not only to southeast
Asia, but equally to nations In Europe,
whom I shall not name now, because it
would serve no useful purpose to do so.
I do know that Secretary of State
Dulles. when he takes on the very heavy
and burdensome duties confronting him,
will have the good will of Congress and
of the American people, for both recognize the grave questions facing him In
his endeavor to meet the problems which
are to arise In the days ahead.
PAN-AMERICAN DAY: AN ALERT
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I have
listened to ~ very Informative and in-

teresting discussion of the problem of
Indo-Asia.
I should like to Invite the attention
of the senate this afternoon for a few
minutes to the fact that there is an area
of the world where International relations are a little more plea.•ant and that
we have a re~pansibllity to keep them so.
Today Is Pan-American Day, a day
which we have come to remember and
consider as being dedicated to increased
friendly relations among the people living in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada. Alaska, and the people of
SOuth America.
Tills year. it S<'ems to me. It Is necessary more than ever to keep alive the fact
that the friendships which we share with
our sister American ~publics are vital,
and that we need hemispheric solidarity
more than we ever needed it in our national history.
Whenever danr,crous misunderstandings anse among the peoples of the
hemisphere, whenever inter-American
friendship is fractured. a leak is opened
in the dike of our mutual security. Let
us not forget that the tide beyond that
dike Is dark and dangerous, and that it
is a rising tide.
I nter-American friendship, then, Is
not merely something to applaud on Pan-
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American Day, to enjoy, to accept as
natural and right and everlasting. U
IS something to cherish. whose growth
we should foster and whose Increase
must be our care.
It is true that good will is a sturdy
plant in the Americas. Our 21 republics share so much as heritage from a
heroic past and as belief in a. bountiful
future that we are likely to believe that
friendship and cooperation for the common good can be taken for granted.
But the hard fact is that in a world so
swiftly subJect to change, nothing can
safely be taken for granted.
A government has to take thoucht In
order to have cooperation and good wlll
even among its o" n people. A family
must take thought to maintain affection
and understanding :tmong all its members. And the American Republics, althouah their friendship Is rooted in their
histories as nations. and although their
solidarity has held firm through the
generations. cannot alford to neglect
the measures which Insure the continuance and the strengthening of that
solidarity.
For years I have been convinced that
cultural Interchanges are among the
most effective supparts of our forelcn
palicy. Tile principles upan which our
own Nation was founded, and the way
ot life \\'hlch we have developed, have
enlarged the horizons of mankind. 'I1lo
better we are understood, the more productive will be our dealings with the
rest of the world. I glimpsed this truth
first In my own student days. My later
experience as a teacher confirmed lt.
The encouragement of interchanges
productive of such understanding has
been one of my constant preoccupat ions
both as a Member of the lower House
and as a Member of this body.
A dozen years ago. in 1942, at a eonterence with a group of Indiana educatorc. I become actively Interested in
the impOrtance of educational exchanges
as a pawerful agency in furthering inter-American relatiOns. Together we
worked out a resolution, which I introduced March 1, 1943. providing for a
scholarship arrangement and a clearinghouse for Information serving our 21 Re·
publics. As a. member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee in the 80th Congress,
In cooperation with ~he Senator from
New Jersey !Mr. SMJTHJ, I introduced
the Smith-Mundt Act which wa.'l dc si~ned to prevent the program of cultural interchange from going down the
drain. My belle! Is no Jess strong now
than then-If anything, it Is strongerthat as the peoples of this hemisphere
grow in knowledge and understanding of
one another, their mutual determination to work to~:ether for the common
good, to stand shoulder t~ shoulder for
the common security, correspondincly
1J1creascs.
This seems to me especially true as regards the exchange of students and of
leaders. There Is no better way of learning to know our fellow man than by
seeing him going about his daily tasks,
revealing himself as we do reveal ourselves when we are at home and at ease.
Our governmental program of exchanrre
or persons has proved its worth time and

